

YOUTH AND RELIGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COUNTERCULTURE [1]

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A perplexing and thought-provoking aspect of religion in society concerns the circumstances and vicissitudes of its change—change of both religion and society—which usually results in the emergence of new religious groups. Recently, a particularly strong thrust of social and religious fermentation has been witnessed during the 1960s in the United States of America, and to a lesser degree, in the other advanced industrial societies. The movement as a whole has been dubbed the counterculture.

Because the new movement found its most fertile soil in the age bracket of youthful persons, I would like to discuss in this paper the relationship of youth and religion in the context of the counterculture. In order to do so, several aspects of the counterculture have to be touched upon. Any analysis ideally calls for a total clarification of the phenomenon concerned. This expectation arises from, among other things, the evident fact that new social phenomena occur within the given context of a certain society, which, seen *a priori*, should and can be explained by the various factors at work within the given context. However, this expectation is not easily fulfilled, because the social and cultural dynamics, or the convergence of the various factors, either are still unknown, or are becoming more and more complex in modern, pluralistic societies. These dynamics probably have to be understood as a dialectical process that produces an ever-changing situation the moments of which cannot be isolated without distorting the phenomena. Any explanation of such a process will be approximate at best, not only, for example, because of the shortness of the time perspective, or because of the paucity of the data gathered, as C. Y. Glock has suggested,¹⁾ but because of the sheer complexity and fluidity of the phenomena. Even an enumeration and a mere description of the facts that have constituted the counterculture seems to be quite difficult, because these facts are changing situations rather than individual facts. The statement, then, that there tends to be considerable disagreement concerning the causes of new religious movements comes as no surprise.²⁾

The limited objective of this paper will be to review some of the literature on the subject and to inquire further into the role of religion in the counterculture and into the differential relationship of youth and the new religious movements: why were some

of the young attracted while others were not?

As a preliminary I will first try to clarify the terminology necessary for a typification of the emerging religious groups, and also briefly sketch the total religious situation of the United States. In a second section I will summarize ethnographic material about seven religious and quasi-religious groups, as manifestations of the counterculture or its follow-up movements as suggested by R. Bellah. The third and last section will be a review and discussion of some evaluations of the phenomena.

I. PRELIMINARY

The first preliminary task is to clarify the terminology for a typification of the new religious groups. Since Troeltsch many attempts have been made towards the formulation and reformulation of the church-sect typology in order to construct adequate concepts for broad application. Most relevant to our present purposes are R. Robertson's distinction between movement and organization and M. B. McGuire's conceptualization of sects and cults.

According to Robertson, "A movement is a dynamic collectivity, concerned with the mobilization of individuals and groups in the pursuit of, or the defence of, specific objectives; whereas an organization is a collectivity concerned primarily with ensuring that certain values and beliefs are upheld in a given society or set of societies."³⁾

Beginning as movements, the new religious groups also can be characterized as sects or cults. Both sect and cult are conceptualized⁴⁾ as taking a negative stance towards the dominant society. Both are a form of social dissent, but the sect considers itself uniquely legitimate (the only way), while the cult is seen as tolerant of other views of life, thus taking a pluralistic attitude toward society and other groups. Concerning this typology it should be noticed with McGuire that such types are not fixed categories. They are moments of a changing situation. In other words, the same collectivity may function as a different organization according to the societal and historical context, or depending on the level of analysis (e.g., national, regional, or local).

Another refining element in McGuire's conceptualization is her distinction between the group as a collectivity and the religious attitudes of the individual members. The foregoing typification of sect or cult refers to a group's claim of religious legitimacy and its general attitude toward society. The term "religious attitudes" refers to the religious emphasis or the insistence on the importance of religion in life. Sectarian and cultic attitudes, then, both of which are seen as attitudes of religious virtuosi who strive toward religious perfection, are distinguished from churchly and denominational attitudes, which are characterized as mass religiosity. However, sectarian and cultic religious attitudes differ from each other in the same way as churchly and denominational attitudes in that they encourage either a diffused or a segmented role for religion in life. In other words, a church as well as a sect tends to emphasize the religious role as pervading all aspects of a person's life; denominations and cults are more apt to separate

the religious and the secular sphere. Sects, consequently, are inclined to require a person's total commitment, while cults do not assert unique legitimacy. In the latter, therefore, there is a less clear boundary between members and nonmembers, the relationship with the group being less strong.

Still another refinement of the sect-cult typology, not mentioned by McGuire, seems to be necessary in order to determine the degree of the common negative attitude towards the dominant society, because the new groups seem to differ quite a lot in this respect. Although most emergent groups introduce alternative systems of belief and life styles, their levels of tension with respect to the larger society cannot be the same. Some groups are more countercultural than others, because some reject almost all of the given society's values, while others are only rejecting some, and still others, on the contrary, endeavor to strengthen traditional morality. Consequently, the new groups should be characterized accordingly.

The second preliminary task is to sketch the historical background and the contemporary religious situation in which the new religious movements have arisen.

To begin with, the U. S. seems to have evolved into a highly secularized and highly religious country at the same time. Put differently, it seems that the secularization tendencies and religious moods have held each other in check, more than on the old continent.

Reviewing very roughly recent Western history,⁵⁾ it can be said that the nineteenth century was a period of irreligious enlightenment of which Marx and Darwin were the paramount exponents. Anti-ecclesiastical sentiments have swept over both the European and American continents but less successfully in the latter. Although several groups of militant secularists and free-thinkers were active in the urban American centers, they were unable to establish a national organization. Their lack of success has been attributed to the early, advanced state of secularization that made their movement more or less incongruent. The separation of state and church already had been accepted as a matter of fact, if not of principle. Established also were the basic rights of freedom of religion, and of the press, speech and assembly. Further, religion itself was not a unidirectional force or a united front that had to be counteracted in order to limit its influence. On the contrary, much opposition existed among the several religious traditions, especially between the Protestant majority and Roman Catholicism. A serious problem from the religious point of view, this religious antagonism, though overcome in principle through the official recognition of religious liberty in the same century, continued to produce animosity until far into the twentieth.

On the other hand, the nineteenth century was the scene of much religious fermentation, revivals and reformation occurring mainly during the 1820-1860 period, which was a time of rapid social change.⁶⁾ Industrial development transformed North America into an advanced nation. The population during that period more than tripled, partly through immigration, thus greatly expanding the cities and altering the situations of

work and life. As a reaction against the dominant, deterministic, Calvinistic faith there developed a new religious mood of personal faith, known as Evangelicalism, which stimulated new lines of theological thought. It also caused the division of many denominations into old and new factions. At the same time, the changing social circumstances produced several new cultic sects and other quasi-religious groups. The general situation solidified in the latter half of the nineteenth century and brought with it a reunification of the divided denominations, thereby strengthening established religion.

A new period of religious growth began after World War I. Concerning the general socio-religious atmosphere at that time, it can be said that a major change occurred with the gradual overcoming of the antagonistic tensions among the main denominations during the second quarter of the present century, as has been suggested by W. Herberg: "America . . . has changed from the , land of immigrants', with its thriving ethnic groups, to the , triple melting pot', in which people tend more and more to identify and locate themselves socially in terms of three great subcommunities—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish—defined in religious terms".⁷⁾

Although reliable statistics are not available for the early decades of the present century, scholars in general are agreed that religiousness in the U. S. has been on the increase, as seen in connection with religious affiliation, church attendance and the general religious mood. This is well proven for the mid-century period. Membership in the churches increased nationally from 49 percent in 1940 to 61 percent in 1957.⁸⁾ The figure for church attendance in 1957 showed the same tendency. The national percentage of weekly attendance stood at 45 percent together with another 21 percent for those attending often. The remaining 34 percent of the people attended seldom (26%) or never (8%).⁹⁾ An indication of still stronger religiosity is found in the opinion polls concerning the religious mood at that time. The polls showed that, apart from actual membership or attendance, 96.4 percent of the American population, 14 years of age and over, identified themselves with a religious denomination.¹⁰⁾

From all these data, it may be realistically concluded that an upswing of religious mood took place during the forties and the early fifties, but that the increase of religious fervor did not extend to the total population. It may be safe to say that about one third of the population was not firmly anchored in established religion and must have been religiously unstable. This, mainly, is an evaluation of the ratio of church attendance. Lack of contact with the supporting group is likely to diminish the chances that people's religious attitudes remain firm, and increase the possibility of growing secularization. The point I am trying to make and will return to toward the end of this paper is, that it most probably is not a matter of mere coincidence that the peak of the counterculture and new religious experimentation occurred in a period of relative decline in commitment to established religion, as we will see presently.

While weekly church attendance was on the rise for more than a decade after World War II, it stayed relatively constant from 1955 until 1961, varying between 47 and 49 per-

cent.¹¹⁾ It decreased gradually to about 40 percent between 1961 and 1974. The same trend of relative decline appeared in the other indicators of religiousness, for example, adherence to religious beliefs (e.g., belief in the existence of God, life after death etc.), religious contributions, construction of new church buildings, religious-book publications, and the number of college degrees granted in religion.

The same argument concerning the connection of religious decline and the rise of new groups extends to the geographical area where the new religious movements have flourished most of all. It is the Western States where the decline of conventional religion has been most prominent. The following are some of the data of this second coincidence.¹²⁾ In the polls concerning religion in 1974 the dozen or so Western States showed a lag in church attendance of about 10 percent in comparison with the other States. Also, people in the West in general were found to be from 3 to 12 percent less positive about orthodox Christian beliefs than the people from other parts of the U. S. Similarly, the Western States had the highest percentages of people who saw themselves as nonreligious. With only 17 percent of the U. S. population, these States are the home of 36 percent of the people who claim not to believe in any religion. As if paralleling this situation, the greatest concentration of spiritual communities experimenting with new religious or other alternative life-styles also tended to be in the West, especially in the San Francisco Bay Area,¹³⁾ this being the simple reason why many of the studies on the new movements have been done there. These studies will be introduced in the following section.

II. THE NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

The following mainly are summaries of ethnographic descriptions of seven new religious, and quasi-religious, movements, the study of which has been undertaken as a research project initiated at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1971. The first report on the findings of the project was published in 1976, edited by Professors C. Y. Glock and R. N. Bellah under the title *The New Religious Consciousness*. The aim of my summary is to attempt a comparison and typification which hopefully will facilitate further assessment, not so much of the meaning of the counterculture as is found in the conclusion of the above-mentioned book, but rather of the religious significance of the individual movements. The summaries will chiefly concentrate on the origin and early development of the groups, their systems of belief and religious practices.

1. *The Krishna Consciousness Movement*¹⁴⁾

Hare Krishna, or officially, The International Society of Krishna Consciousness was founded in New York in 1965 by a retired businessman from India, A. C. Bhaktivedanta, but moved to San Francisco two years later. There, in the hippie milieu of Haight-Ashbury, the movement was able to convert quickly from 150 to 200 persons who became full members of the temple. By 1974 the organization had grown to 14 temples through-

out the world with a membership of approximately five thousand.

The beliefs of this new group hail from the Bhagavad-Gita as interpreted by an Indian religious discipline existing since the fifth century and of which Bhaktivedanta was an adherent. As will be the case with respect to most new sects and cults, experience and participation rather than doctrine are seen as most significant. It is emphasized that real understanding comes through practice and that the end of learning is not communicable knowledge but self-realization.

This goal is to be attained in and through the ceremonies (*kirtan*) that are held three times a day, and which consist of chanting and dancing. Recital of Sanskrit mantras is done to the accompaniment of several musical instruments, harmoniums, flutes, tamborines, finger cymbals, etc. Characteristic of this ritual is its crescendoes and decrescendoes of rhythm and loudness.

Hare Krishna allows free attendance of the ceremonies but requires a serious commitment and rigorous conduct from full members. After a trial period of about six months, devotees enter the temple, surrendering everything they possess; they take on a Sanskrit name and don Hindu orange robes. Males have their heads shaved. Meals are strictly vegetarian. All intoxicants are forbidden. Much time is spent in preparation of the *kirtan*. The ultimate goal is creating a new identity and reaching enlightenment.

Communal life is a rule, but a full devotee can travel to other temples in the country. Several hundreds have been sent to India for permanent devotional service at the headquarters. Celibacy is required during the trial period and encouraged later. Marriage can be allowed only as an exclusive bond preferably between a male and a female devotee, with procreation as its only goal. Thus, group life is seen as a condition but not as a goal of religious life. Close personal relations are virtually absent, because the final object of love is Krishna as is implied in Bhakti or devotional yoga.

A social characteristic of most members was their hippie background. They were youngsters coming almost exclusively from white, prosperous, middle-class homes, who had experience with drugs prior to conversion.

Hare Krishna as a religious group, in its early American phase of development, can be characterized as a sectarian religious movement with sectarian religious attitudes. In other words, this group shows a mystic attitude towards life, demanding renunciation of worldly pleasures and total surrender to the community. Hare Krishna also is highly countercultural because it rejects conventional society to the point of nurturing the hope, and actually preparing for, the coming of a new age of peace and love.

2. *The Divine Light Mission*¹⁵⁾

The Divine Light Mission (DLM) is an universalistic cult of Indian origin, said to have about five million followers including eighty thousand Americans, who converted to the movement between 1971 and 1974.

The main beliefs of DLM are the following: (1) Belief in God, creator and unifying

entity of the cosmos; (2) the knowledge of God is taught and mediated by the child guru and perfect master Maharaj Ji, who bestows it upon all those who agree to become his devotees; (3) this knowledge actually is received by means of the meditation in which God is experienced in several ways: as inner light, as the music of the spheres, as nectar flowing through the body and as a kind of internal vibration.

The principal religious activities, next to the meditation, are attending the *Sat Sang*—mutual discussion of the religious experiences—and service for the guru or to the group, including proselytizing.

DLM recognizes three categories of followers: (1) The ashram residents, who are people in full service, leading an ascetic life as celibates and vegetarians. Their numbers increased from six in 1971 to over one thousand in early 1974. (2) The premies are second degree members, who, as families and individuals live in communal households, and who keep to the ascetic life at least on the premises. They turn over 30 percent of their income to the headquarters and cooperate with it in other ways. (3) Lastly, there are the numerous devotees who do not live in premie centers and who are only loosely connected with the movement. Estimates of their numbers are based on attendance at unadvertised programs.

As a religious movement DLM seems to be best characterized as a combination of a sect and a cult, somewhat depending on the kind of membership. Since the group requires or encourages complete surrender to the method and to the guru, it shows a definite tendency toward sectarian religious attitudes, but somehow mixed with cultic ones, because their first goal seems to be, not religion itself but a happier life through a new awareness. Similarly, DLM is not entirely countercultural, because it shows conformist attitudes toward society in that it keeps to the common American life style.

3. *The Healthy-Happy-Holy Organization (3HO)*¹⁶⁾

This religious movement of Sikh origin, was founded in 1969 by Yogi Bajan, who, while an army and customs officer in India, studied several traditions of yoga, and who decided to emigrate to the U. S. at the age of forty. Bajan's organization grew out of yoga classes he began to teach in Los Angeles, which attracted many young people of the counterculture. Bajan began to create for them a yoga-centered life-style which he called 3HO. Towards 1974 the organization counted about one hundred centers in the U. S. to which belonged several thousands of committed members.

Bajan's goal was, he claimed, not proselytizing but educating spiritually liberated people. For the law, therefore, he had his organization recorded as a nonprofit educational organization. Nevertheless, interested people got opportunities to make personal commitments to 3HO and to join the Sikh Dharma Brotherhood, adopting the following beliefs and practices: Faith in the one Creator-God; practice of the morning meditation (*Sadhana*) every day; wearing one's hair uncut, covered with a turban (male) or otherwise covered up (female); following a vegetarian diet; living a strict monogamous,

righteous, patriotic life; and promising cooperation with the 3HO organization.

The most committed members live in ashrams, whose minimal communal life consists of participating together in the morning exercises and having meals together. The rest of the day they spend in outside activities, working or attending school. Twice a year they may attend a session of ten days in remote, natural surroundings, offering training in *kundalini* and *tantric* yoga. A typical day includes the following activities.

(1) A session of kundalini yoga that begins at five in the morning after a short prayer, and continues for three hours. It consists of a series of breathing exercises, followed by much longer and strenuous physical exercises, followed by the chanting of a mantra in Punjabi, followed again by meditation done while alternatively reciting, whispering, and mentally repeating some simple sounds (sa-ta-na-ma). The aim of this yoga is to free potential energy (kundalini) for use and expression in daily life. The ultimate goal is "God-realization" and liberation from the endless cycle of births and deaths.

(2) A session in tantric yoga is held starting at eleven o'clock and lasts for two hours. Tantric yoga is not a daily part of 3HO life. It is taught only by Yogi Bhajan himself. Normally it has to be performed together with a partner of the opposite sex. The individual exercises, as for instance holding a difficult bodily position for a long time while repeating a complicated mantra in conjunction with the partner, are physically and emotionally difficult. It is said that there are strong aftereffects of elation and exhaustion. Its proper goal is psychotherapeutic in character, replacing the negative habits of the mind with positive ones. It is also supposed to heighten group consciousness and to create a deep feeling of harmony with the whole universe.

(3) Other activities include lectures, training in self-defense sports, pressure-points massage, chant rehearsals, shopping for yoga articles, free time, and, of course, the morning and evening meals. All activity takes place in silence as much as possible. The day ends with a session of spiritual singing after dinner, of folk and rock songs, with a religious content.

3HO seems to be a typical cult—especially for those who do not join the Sikh Brotherhood—in which secular and religious pursuits seem to be successfully combined. Their religious attitudes also tend to be cultic, because the main activity consists of physical exercises to which a religious dimension is added. Properly religious ceremonies are very few and extremely simple. The movement is countercultural because of its foreign origin and its concern for keeping to Sikh customs, even as most of its values seem to be similar to the traditional Christian ones.

4. *The Jesus People*¹⁷⁾

The Jesus people or Jesus freaks are collective names for an assortment of loosely organized groups living in Christian houses and communes that have been set up by former hippies and young people who have drifted for some time, but who came to believe in Jesus. Jesus freaks began to appear as early as 1967 together with a kind of

Jesus culture that produced Jesus posters, songs, T-shirts, etc. The movement as a whole also has been called the Jesus Movement. Some particular groups that grew out of this atmosphere are the left-inclined Christian World Liberation Front that will be described below, the right-oriented Campus Crusade for Christ, Jews for Jesus, and the extremist Children of God.

The common characteristics of the Jesus people are their youth (mostly school drop-outs), and their predominantly Anglo-Saxon, middle-class status, some with, and others without a religious background. Most recruits stay only temporarily in one of the groups. Their numbers have been estimated at many thousands, perhaps as many as thirty thousand living in about six hundred communal houses.

The Christian house is a combination of family, work group and congregation, or a cross between a Christian dormitory and a commune. Their daily routines of life, directed by paternal leadership, consist of Bible study classes, street proselytizing, prayer meetings, and also music and dancing. Often they meet in their coffee houses for discussions and to talk to prospective members. Organizational activity especially concerns publications, particularly newspapers, the combined circulation of which ranges from 100,000 to 400,000.

The Christian World Liberation Front, to be introduced presently, constitutes one particular type of organization of Jesus people, but it is considered to be representative in its religious orientation.

*The Christian World Liberation Front (CWLF)*¹⁸⁾

This movement was started in 1969 by three missionary minded families in Berkeley. They began their new ministry by preaching to the street people, the campus youth and political radicals. They were able to attract many of them through various activities such as, campus preaching, the distribution of leaflets, public baptisms, political rallies, street-theater and especially through their monthly newspaper "Right On", called the cornerstone of their ministries.

In the early seventies, they had about thirty-five people on their staff at any one time (average time of cooperation as a staff member was about two years), and somewhere between one hundred and two hundred people living in their communal houses.

The fluctuation of staff members and committed people is not only a result of varying success at conversion, but also reflects their general goal of finding Jesus and of continuing thereafter possibly away from the CWLF in other social or political activities. It also may reflect the policy changes that came about in even such a short period as five years, partly because of altering situations, partly because of change in the leadership itself. Concretely, the movement's activity changed from street and campus preaching to counseling and other more churchly ministries, while their theology broadened into a more mature and inclusive Christology.

What the beliefs of the Jesus People have been will be readily understood from their

symbolizations of Jesus. Of central importance in the beginning stage was the representation of Jesus as the radical Alternative. Belief in Jesus was considered to be a different and effective way of confronting the world as compared with earlier approaches. Jesus would deliver people from bondage, drug addiction, and from meaningless relationships. He was the answer to loneliness, insecurity and self-doubt.

Also, since the young people sought and insisted on experience, Jesus was represented as someone to relate to, as one's best friend, in one word, as the Experience. However, their Jesus was different from the Jesus of the traditional churches and middle-class people. They were fascinated by the image of Jesus as taking people as they are, preferably the poor and marginal people. So, Jesus as "One of us" was also an important image, suggestive of a tendency of permitting or overlooking shortcomings and of reducing the necessity of living a radical religious way of life. This image, also, may be related to their leftist orientation, which was not a matter of principle but of natural inclination, as is mentioned in the description.

Again, Jesus was believed in as "coming soon". The literal second coming was to them part of the Biblical message, but mainly as a source of hope and reassurance, not as a rationale for making a positive relationship to the world irrelevant.

Because of the internal changes in the CWLF, it is not easy to decide on its typological characterization, except that it can be seen as a typical "movement". The reason why the CWLF did not attract a strong charismatic leadership, may be related to its moderate goal, expressed by means of the frequently used term "homecoming", a return to society, which did not ask for such leadership. Further, religious attitudes in the CWLF seem to be geared more to mass religiosity than to religious virtuosity. Similarly, the CWLF can be seen as only moderately countercultural, because its main thrust went into the conversion of street people and political radicals, which can be taken to mean that they—although left-oriented and remaining critical of society—headed toward reconversion in the direction of traditional values.

5. *The Catholic Charismatic Renewal*⁽⁹⁾

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (CCR), or Catholic Pentecostal movement is an experimental movement within the church approved of by the hierarchy. Its emergence and development must be connected with the atmosphere of innovation that originated after the Vatican Council (1960–1965), and with other movements in the Catholic church such as the Cursillo (an intensive experiential weekend retreat), the Christian Family Movement, and Marriage Encounter (a weekend retreat for married couples). But it also must be seen in relation to the neo-Pentecostal groups that existed in the late 1950s among Episcopalians and in the early sixties also among American Lutherans and Presbyterians.

Actually, the movement started in 1967 at the theological faculty of Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, as a prayer group fashioned on the pattern of Protestant neo-Pente-

costal meetings. Through friendship relations the prayer group activity spread to other universities and churches throughout the country. By 1973 the movement had attracted over a hundred thousand interested people in the U. S., meanwhile spreading to many other countries throughout the world. By 1980, the number of participants in the U. S had increased to approximately 750,000.

Though intra-ecclesial, the movement has its own headquarters that provides guidance to the leaders of the local chapters. A monthly newsletter is published and an annual convention held.

The main activity of CCR is the weekly prayer meeting that lasts for about an hour, and is held in a room where the participants usually sit on the floor, ring-wise and cross-legged. The meetings may count only a few persons or as many as two hundred. The meeting itself usually begins with guitar music and hymn singing. Its further proceedings are left to individual initiative as much as possible, because it is believed that people are moved by the Holy Spirit. Any person may start an individual prayer or begin to speak in tongues (glossolalia), or begin to read a psalm aloud or a Biblical text he or she says to have "received". Others, with closed eyes, may pronounce Biblical sounding aphorisms, called prophecies. Still others may propose more singing or periods of silence. Most initiatives are concluded by utterances of "Praise the Lord" by the other attendants. The meeting ends with an allocution of the priest summing up what the Lord is telling his faithful, interpreting glossolalia, prophecies or the texts that have been read. After the meeting, there usually is occasion for confessions, or for a person to be prayed with in order to get healed in one or other illness or mental affliction. All these things are what is meant the practice of charismatic activity and the receiving of the "baptism of the Holy Spirit."

As a result of these new spiritual experiences, networks of more pervasive interpersonal relationships have come into existence. Many people meet more often than once a week in order to pray and discuss what they are doing, and to help each other. Some parishes are being reorganized or revitalized by charismatic minded priests and lay people.

Characteristic of this movement is its emphasis on renewal rather than reform, by which they keep to church religion (a church within a church), but which implies that they strive toward virtuoso religiosity, a sectarian tendency according to the above typology. Also, because they only aim at renewal, the movement cannot be called countercultural, as further may be suggested by the fact that CCR attracts mostly middle-class middle-aged people.

6. *The Human Potential Movement*²⁰⁾

The term "Human Potential movement" came into use around 1970 to designate a number of organizations that specialize in instruction and training for the control of inner physiological and emotional states, for becoming aware of, and realizing unexplored

human potential in order to improve the quality of life, or to create a more holistic sense of Self.

The origin of this movement may be traced to sensitivity training in the late 1940s and to the study of group dynamics that attracted nationwide interest in the 1960s. Its development, also, has been much stimulated by research in the human sciences, especially in psychology, where a new orientation was initiated in an existentialist, psychoanalytic perspective, called humanistic psychology (Maslow, Fromm, Frankl etc.).

Best known among the Human Potential movements are the various encounter groups, yoga training, Transcendental Meditation (TM), Erhard Seminars Training (est), Silva Mind Control, the Esalen Institute, Arica Training and Psychosynthesis. Several of these have developed into large-scale organizations, setting up growth centers (at least 25 in the San Francisco area alone), which sponsor weekend sessions for instruction and training. The numbers of their combined customers run into the millions.²¹⁾ This certainly is no exaggeration, since many people have had indirect contact—and thereby introduction to—the new awareness and encounter business through several agents: educational institutes such as high schools and colleges, therapists and clergy using related techniques in group work, and on-the-job vocational training.

The success of this movement is explained by reference to the structural features of the growth centers and to a series of personal motivations. There is relatively easy accessibility both in disciplinary and financial terms, requiring only a very limited commitment for the duration of the training session. Motivations on the side of the participants may be social, sensual, and therapeutic as well as transpersonal:

- (1) Social attraction exists for people who, lacking in personal relationships, feel lonely and receive the wished-for attention in encounter groups, because the latter endeavor to take all their members seriously. Also, these persons may find opportunities in the setting of encounter groups for self-revelation, releasing negative feelings and guilt, etc.
- (2) Some growth groups, like massage workshops, teach and encourage sensual bodily contacts aimed at rediscovering the awareness of the participant's own body.
- (3) There are therapeutic attractions for people who are afflicted with problems, real or imagined.
- (4) Some people seem to seek transpersonal experiences, which are numerous and varied. Included are self-actualization, looking for ultimate values, mystical experience, cosmic awareness, and para-psychological power in order to gain influence over objects and other people. The latter attitude may lead to preoccupation with the occult.

Since Human Potential groups are almost by definition not religious, and since participation is only occasional, they are after all in a different category. As cultural activities, they do not seem to be countercultural, even if some of them rely on exoteric knowledge, partly again because of their nonreligious but also fashionable character.

The Synanon Foundation was established in 1958 as a nonprofit organization and as a community for the rehabilitation of drug addicts. Therefore, it was named "The People Business". Community life and work for the community together with participation in group therapy constitutes the rehabilitation program.

Life in community is organized as much as possible around the collective use of facilities, dining halls, recreation rooms and dormitories. The atmosphere is family-like but very strict at the same time. The members are taught to be friendly to everyone and to welcome anyone into their groups. Absolute observation of the rules is required, especially of the prohibition of all stimulants and all physical violence or threats of violence. Contacts with outsiders are mostly organized through visits and open-door days once a week.

Since participants increased quickly in number, and cooperation and donations from the public increased also, Synanon was able to expand its facilities and operations even to the point of becoming a *de facto* business enterprise run by its communities. It includes gasoline stations, a gift advertising and distribution system, and ranching as well as therapeutic group encounter services for the larger public.

Though thought to be quite successful in its therapeutic objective, participant turnover has been a natural result of the voluntary character of the program, which is supposed to continue for four months. It has been estimated that during the period 1958-1972 over fifteen thousand people have resided in Synanon, half of whom have left within the first month. In 1972 there were about eighteen hundred residents in the various communities, with an average age of about twenty-three. According to later news reports, however, this population has decreased to half that size in the course of the following six years.

After ten years of operation Synanon changed its policy in 1968 towards becoming an alternative society with a permanent population to which it would provide all necessary services, from the cradle to the grave. Henceforth, not only drug addicts but anyone interested in its lifestyle could apply for membership. People entering the organization work as much as possible in and for the community, receiving only a small amount of pocket money. Others, who keep outside jobs, are required to pay the cost of their living but are encouraged to donate more, preferably their total salary, so that they may receive full status in the community.

For the same reasons as the Human Potential movements, Synanon, being a secular society, cannot be characterized as a religious sect or cult. However, since it became an alternative society for life, it shows at least quasi-religious, cultic-sectarian tendencies. By the same token, Synanon is at least moderately countercultural, because it evidently espouses a different set of values.

III. INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

1. *Bellah and Glock's cultural interpretation*²³⁾

Both Bellah and Glock's conclusions from the afore-mentioned research project concern the significance of the counterculture in American society, but there are some differences of perspective. Bellah's interpretation stays on the most general level of cultural change, while Glock's is more concrete in that he touches upon the different factors of social change. To go into some detail, their interpretations run as follows.

Bellah explicitly refrains from presenting a direct explanation as to why a cultural crisis occurred at the time it did, but he sees it as the outcome of the particular development of American culture. He observes that the crisis was brought about as much by the success of American society as by its failures. His full argument seems best summarized by the following quotes: "The deepest cause, no matter what particular factors contributed to the actual timing, was, in my opinion, the inability of utilitarian individualism to provide a meaningful pattern of personal and social existence, especially when its alliance with biblical religion began to sag, because biblical religion itself had been gutted in the process. I would thus interpret the crisis of the sixties above all as a crisis of meaning, a religious crisis, with major political, social, and cultural consequences to be sure."²⁴⁾ Concerning the significance of the crisis Bellah states: "... the major meaning of the sixties was purely negative: the erosion of the legitimacy of the American way of life."²⁵⁾

To follow Bellah's interpretation more closely, he argues that the meaning of life in the United States before the crisis, mainly heralding from biblical religion and utilitarianism, had enabled America to see itself as an elect people and a successful society, in which the individuals were free to pursue the maximization of their self-interest, while society itself continually developed towards the rationalization of means, producing a continuous expansion of wealth and power. The principal agents of this rationalization, of course, have been science, technology and bureaucratic organization. The counterculture, then, must be seen as a reaction against the ruthless advance of technical reason, polarizing into an urge toward socialism and political radicalism on the one hand, and on the other, a reorientation toward religious mysticism and the experimentation with alternative patterns of living. The latter impulses have been the strongest.

The churches were not prepared to cope with the crisis of the sixties, because they were too strongly incorporated into the established society. Young people turned to religions of Asian origin, which were more compatible with the prevailing anti-utilitarian, anti-individualistic mood.

As for the individual follow-up movements of the counterculture, they have been functional as "survival units," providing a stable setting for disoriented young people, but they are seen by Bellah as having little potential for the future. American society most probably will continue with its liberal scenario under its former ideology of utili-

tarian individualism, but with still less biblical restraint, while a minor role may be played by oriental religious groups and the human-potential movement.

Glock's thesis, on the other hand, is that "the youth counterculture of the sixties was not an initiator of any significant change in American Society. Rather... it was a highly visible sign of fundamental changes already under way."²⁶ About the outward appearances of that "sign," two things of central importance are mentioned: the all-encompassing character of protest it entailed and the widespread experimentation with alternatives. Protest, that is to say, against everything from politics and religion to education, work and the family. Experimentation is engaged in in order to revolutionize the Self, rather than society.

The fundamental changes that have been going on since several decades ago, still according to Glock, are social and cultural. The social changes (social factors) are merely mentioned. They are: the phenomenon of urbanization and the population explosion accompanied by growing affluence, and the rise of the level of education together with the spread of the mass media.

Cultural change is taken to mean change in the dominant world view, resulting in loss of meaning. This change is said to be the intervening, cognitive variable, and is consequently elaborated on. In a way quite similar to Bellah, Glock distinguishes a secular and a religious part in the imagery of the world view. The secular part implied that human beings were in control of what happened to them. People, therefore, were responsible for their actions. Achievement had become the major goal of life and had been interpreted more and more in the sense of individual acquisition of wealth and prestige. The religious counterpart of the world view was that, after all, God is in control and that the intelligence endowed creatures should go along and do God's will.

Change in the dominant world view was inspired by science, especially by the social sciences. They have challenged both the above views that God, or that man is the master of the situation. God gradually has been removed from the human scene, and man himself has come to be thought of as the product of various biological, psychological, and social forces, without clear insight, however as to what in man's constitution or his environment is most decisive for his actions. The result of this development was much uncertainty as to what man and society really are, while at the same time the underlying assumptions of the old imageries were undermined.

In the domain of praxis, serious efforts had been made to deal with old and new social problems. However, the results had been inadequate. Important implications of the new world view were not recognized or not given the necessary attention. By the time of the sixties, many unsuccessful Americans were bitterly frustrated, while successful people had been made sensitive to the iniquities of society.

The actual breakout of the crisis was effected by the escalating and deteriorating Vietnam War. Open rebellion became possible because numerous college youth had the

"leisure" and means to protest, and could be organized because leadership was available from older discontented citizens.

Although the counterculture was united in its stand against the old myths and old social arrangements, it could not produce a broadly acceptable alternative. This means, at the same time, that the old world view, and especially the old social institutions, did largely prevail, wide experimentation notwithstanding. In the seventies, the youth culture did not disappear, but became much less visible. The sixties may be seen as an adumbration of future cultural upheaval, should society and its world view remain unstable.

The importance of the cultural analyses of Bellah and Glock is beyond doubt. The sociocultural sphere certainly is the context within which new social phenomena take shape. However, some parts of statements in their interpretations seem to call for further discussion, the more so because of the exploratory nature of their studies and the tentative character of the conclusions. For instance, at first it was Bellah's view that the meaning of the counterculture was purely negative, but later on he mentioned that it had been a reaction against the one-dimensional development of technical reason. These statements, the former functionalist and the latter existentialist, need not be contradictory, but could be more balanced. Similarly, Bellah's central thesis about the deeper nature of the crisis of consciousness as "a crisis of meaning, a religious crisis," puts religious and other human meaning on the same level. This can be explained in the sense that religion covers more than church religiousness. Accordingly, loss of meaning, which is apt to occur through alienation, may affect people profoundly. For example, severe damage to fundamental relationships or the loss of hope with respect to the future may cause a person to give up his or her religious beliefs. If the person in such a situation does not believe in any religion from the beginning, his life may have lost its "deepest or only" significance. Loss of meaning in this case can be seen as equivalent to loss of religious orientation. Anyway, the interconnectedness of various contexts of meaning is a presupposition for the existence of human identity; it therefore justifies the opinion that a crisis of meaning is a religious crisis. Yet, still there remains the necessity of distinguishing various contexts of meaning, if there is to be such a discipline as the sociology of religion. Also, the interrelations of these contexts can be discussed. If some persons lose their religious convictions because of alienation or other problems, others may find themselves relinquishing religious belief, or growing up without them, and then may feel free to do what they want, or even feel compelled to spiritual wanderings. I would like to argue for the prominence of the latter case, but, of course, both possibilities and combinations of them can be investigated.

One way to arrive at distinctions within the context of meaning is to shift the focus of analysis from the cultural level to the personal, the level of motivation, which was not touched upon by Bellah and Glock in their interpretation of the counterculture.

Looking into motivations will also bring us gradually to the differential relationship of youth and the counterculture.

2. *Individual and Collective Motivations*

Discussions of the problem of motivation with respect to new religious groups can be found in the literature about the origin and evolution of religious sects and cults. An extensive historical study has been presented by W. Stark in the second volume of his *Sociology of Religion*.²⁷⁾

Stark's basic thesis is that "The last root of all sectarianism lies in the alienation of some group from the inclusive society, within which it has to carry on its life. It is a kind of protest movement, distinguished from other similar movements by the basic fact that it experiences and expresses its dissatisfactions and strivings in religious (rather than political or economic or generally secular) terms."²⁸⁾

There are many causes of alienation. First of all, there are the socio-economic circumstances of poverty and humiliation. An interesting example provided by Stark is that of the textile industry, which often has proved a fertile soil for sectarian movements. The reason is that feelings of alienation were apt to be aroused by the monotonous work of weaving as well as by the instability of the trade. Unstable situations often arose from its dependence on foreign raw materials and on distant markets. Even technological progress has been a factor in its periodical instability.

Also, wealth, which is thought to relate to conservatism, has been a source of alienation in medieval and modern history. This was the case in the situation in which new riches were an object of contempt. The merchant class, therefore, has been strongly represented in some sects.

Minor social circumstances of sectarianism are the dissatisfactions that may be experienced by a nation, a race, a sex or an age group. Since mostly young people were involved in the countercultural movements, I will only summarize Stark's argumentation concerning the alienation of youth, which has become a major factor, I think.

According to Stark, adolescents may become alienated through feelings of guilt, likely to arise in Western society in connection with the activation of the sex urge. Such problems are explicitly dealt with by the sects. Also, the newly found awareness of independence may lead to criticism of the established society and may lead further to teenage revolt. In this way, youngsters either try to throw off imposed restrictions on freedom or to transcend them in better social relationships.

A more elaborate hypothesis concerning the relationship of alienation to new religious movements was formulated by C. Glock in the years before the counterculture.²⁹⁾ This hypothetical theory could be called the model of relative deprivation. As we will see shortly, this theory was applied to some movements within the counterculture, but not, as far as I know by Glock himself.

Glock developed and generalized a much earlier theory of the social sources of de-

nominalism by Richard Niebuhr, who had argued that new religious movements come into existence as a result of the interplay between social unrest and religious dissent. Glock, concentrating on the situation of deprivation as a necessary condition for the rise of new religious movements, distinguished five types of deprivation. Briefly summarized, they are as follows:

- (1) Economic deprivation arises out of poverty, which sometimes is a subjectively assessed sense of deprivation. Because there is a tendency in this case to resent society as a whole, economic deprivation may be the cause of revolutionary movements in the secular sphere. In the religious one, it is a precondition for the rise of sects, which are at least symbolically revolutionary.
- (2) Social deprivation may be experienced as a result of loss of status and prestige or lack of opportunity to participate in society. Because society is found to be at fault only partially, in both the secular and the religious domains reactions are usually reformatory. Thus, a new church may be conceived of in order to accommodate such deprived groups to the larger society.
- (3) Organismic deprivation is apt to occur in people in ill health or in people having physical or mental deformities. Faith-healing movements have been organized in several churches. When healing is the exclusive concern of a religious group, the group tends to take the form of a cult.
- (4) Ethical deprivation refers to value conflicts that mainly arise in society's middle classes and its elites. As an outgrowth of value conflicts, dissent is apt to be partial, and ensuing religious or secular reactions will typically be reformatory in character.
- (5) Psychic deprivation is a kind of anomie which occurs when people find themselves without meaningful values. It is primarily the result of severe and unresolved social deprivations and organismic ones. Organizational responses in the secular sphere are generally revolutionary and extreme (radical politics), involving a rejection of the prevailing value system. In the religious domain, cult varieties, including occult groups, are apt to arise.

An important specification of the theory of deprivation is Glock's own evaluation that deprivation as a causal factor must be seen as a precondition. In order for deprivation to lead to an organizational response, other conditions are necessary—for example, that the deprivation be shared and that capable leadership be available. Another specification is that if a particular deprivation is dominant, it is likely that a particular organizational response will follow, so that sects are apt to arise from economic deprivations, churches when the deprivation is mainly social, and cults when the deprivation is psychic.

In order to avoid confusion, it should be added that in the above theory Glock understands the terms cult and sect in a way different from that in which they have been used in this paper so far. To Glock: "Cults are religious movements which draw their inspiration from other than the primary religion of the culture, and which are not

schismatic movements in the same sense as sects, whose concern is with preserving a purer form of traditional faith.”³⁰⁾

As for the applicability of Glock's model, other historical situations aside, it seems to have minimal use in the case of the new movements of the counterculture, especially if one wants to connect particular deprivations with particular forms of association. The counterculture has spawned a plethora of religious and other groups, quite different in character, but nevertheless all attracting adherents from the same white Anglo-Saxon middle-class youth.

The difficulty of using Glock's model is illustrated by an actual attempt to utilize it in explaining the genesis of the Jesus People.³¹⁾ All types of deprivations, except the economic one, are seen as applicable to their motivations. The ethical, psychic, and social deprivations especially are considered to be much in evidence, while even the organismic one is hypothetically included, because many of those people experienced severe living conditions as a result of their hippie style of life.

Considered separately, the ethical deprivation is seen as part of the motivation of the Jesus People, because of their broad anti-establishment stance on several issues. Psychic deprivation is related to their search for a new identity and “closure,” or “rebirth” in their own parlance, which is found in a simple belief in Jesus. Also, much evidence is found for the social deprivation in the Jesus People's “search for belonging,” which is another theme that materialized in their communal lifestyle. In respect to social deprivation, it is also mentioned that youth constitutes a stage in life characterized by relative powerlessness and involving considerable role strain. It therefore represents a kind of loss of status, which is made up for in the movement by an alternative status system. This, evidently, applies not only to the Jesus People, but to all the new movements.

Thus, precisely the broad application of Glock's model, without any reference to the structural features of the group concerned, is proof of its minimal explanatory value for particular groups. Even more, this broad applicability suggests that the deprivations experienced by youth are the problem situation itself that has to be explained. This, of course, is considerably different from seeing deprivations as “preconditions,” or as explaining factors.

Assuming that deprivation in general is the primary problematic factor actually comes near to Glock's later interpretation of the youth culture of the sixties as a “sign” of changes that had been underway, the appearance of which he, accordingly, together with Bellah, explains as a result of socio-cultural change. Glock and Bellah's united stance (1976) is that the crisis in consciousness was effected by the changing world view and by the failure of the dominant ideology (utilitarianism and biblical religion) to provide satisfactory meaning. Even if there is no doubt about the truth of this view, the question remains why it was that only some of the young became deprived or alienated from the larger society as it was in the sixties. For the same reason, the problem

of motivation turns out to be a secondary problem: what was the ground of the particular motivations of wayward youth? Why did they become alienated? Further, also, the crucial question is that of "their" contexts of meaning. This cannot be investigated solely on the level of culture; it also has to be treated on the level of individual consciousness.

3. *Alienation as the Core of the Counterculture*

If alienation, more than just experience of problems or frustrations,³²⁾ is the central problem of the counterculture, it brings with it the not small task of exploring a considerable amount of literature on the subject. This I have to leave for the future. For the time being, I would like to continue, within the limits of this paper, with a discussion of alienation in its relationship to the socio-cultural sphere. This will be legitimate because alienation, being a problem of individuals, is at the same time a socio-cultural problem.

An important contribution to the analysis of modern society and culture has come from Daniel Bell.³³⁾ Sketched very roughly, Bell has pointed out that post-industrial societies are not logically integrated entities. On the contrary, they consist of different orders, each of which functions and develops according to its own axioms and rhythms. Thus, three domains can be easily distinguished: the techno-economic structure, the polity, and the culture. It is the discordances among these realms which are responsible for the contradictions of modern society. The most problematic contradiction is that which arises between the economic order and culture. The former necessitates functional rationality and, therefore, restraint, while the latter emphasizes freedom. The culture of modern Western society has become the area of creation and free expression, with the ultimate goal of self-realization and self-fulfilment.

A suggestion we get from Bell's analysis is that, above all, youth will act according to the moods of the time, perhaps as an expression of their newly found sense of independence, as W. Stark has suggested. Another hint is that some individuals may be more motivated to pursue economic goals, while others feel more attracted by immediately gratifying, cultural goals. Most attracted to the cultural goals of the counterculture were the college youth, mainly hailing from the well-to-do middle class. It was often mentioned in the descriptions of the new, countercultural movements that many of their followers had been dropouts with a history of drug addiction.³⁴⁾

The crucial question then becomes: why the middle-class youth? One precondition concerns its affluence. Though affluence itself by no means is related directly to countercultural movements, it certainly provides access to many things money can buy, and may lead to indulgence, which may easily lower the level of endurance, necessary to reach the remoter, economic goals, which, in turn, are the object of severe competition. This competition may become too severe for many of the middle-class youth to be effectively dealt with by means of a middle-class morale that has been weakened or

which was not strong enough from the beginning. Also, it is a fact that middle-class youth are the most numerous; this may be responsible for still more severe competition within this class, at least psychologically.

This argument can be followed through in respect to the relationship of youth and religion. It seems evident that the decline of established religion, touched upon in the introductory part of this paper, greatly helps to smooth the way towards alternative systems of belief. This is only a simple restatement of what Bellah and Glock have explained in much detail in their argumentation concerning the change of the world view and dominant ideology, which are rooted in traditional religion. While it is inconceivable that people, even youngsters, with a firm traditional faith, will come to distrust the fundamental values of their society, which stem from that very faith, it seems much more conceivable that they will be inclined to doubt those social *values*, when they do not have a corresponding religious belief, and still more so when they already have come to disbelieve in the *goals* of their society. The latter attitude definitely manifests an instance of alienation, to which, again, the middle-class youth seems most susceptible. This opinion, then, differs considerably from Bellah's, which entails that the crisis of the sixties was "a crisis of meaning, a religious crisis". To me, it seems more appropriate to characterize the loss of faith in society as, above all, a social crisis or a crisis of alienation, because a definite detachment of social moorings has more serious consequences than a specifically religious crisis, or a loss of faith in a certain religion.

All this will not amount to a full explanation as to why alienation occurred and what the components of the problem were, but it represents, I think, a strong indication of the core of the counterculture. The same line of thought can be continued concerning the question of the significance of religion in the counterculture, with which I will finish this paper.

4. *The Function and significance of Religion in the Counterculture*

How researchers see the function of religion in the movements of the counterculture tends to depend on their sociological approach. For example, R. Bellah has denoted the follow-up movements of the counterculture "survival units". This is a functionalist's statement, and as such is valid, but it does not take into account that any religion or ideology (a nonreligious belief) is the central part of the human identity, and the only means of constituting a stable identity.³⁵⁾ According to this phenomenological approach, any religion or corresponding ideology functions as a factor of survival. In this perspective, it can be said that religion, together with non-religion, constitutes the two fundamental orientations of the mind, both of which, however, appear in countless varieties:—Which variation one "happens" to follow is accidental and situational.—Consequently, if religion is only one of the two possibilities men can turn to in order to give direction to their lives, the function of religion in the counterculture is necessarily limited.

The spiritual orientations to be found in the United States are characterized by considerable variety. This is vividly illustrated in *The Encyclopedia of American Religions*,³⁶⁾ which lists no fewer than 1,200 religious bodies, churches, denominations, sects, cults, and communes, classified into seventeen families. The variety of the countercultural movements, no doubt, has to do with the varied religious situation of the country.

When will people turn to a new religious orientation? It is commonly said that they do so in times of rapid social change or cultural upheaval, or that new religions arise in such situations. This cannot be denied, but I think that social change is not a sufficient condition. Considering the development of the counterculture, it seems more plausible that people turn to new religious movements or equivalent nonreligious movements when they experience high levels of alienation. In other words, sufficient conditions have to exist both in society and in people. To the subjective conditions I will turn in the near future.

To be continued.

NOTES

- 1) Glock, Charles Y. and Bellah, Robert N. (eds), *The New Religious Consciousness*, University of California Press, 1976, p. 353.
- 2) Wuthnow, Robert, *Experimentation in American Religion*, University of California Press, 1978, p. 2.
- 3) Robertson, Roland, *The Sociological Interpretation of Religion*, Schocken Books, 1970, p. 114.
- 4) For the notes concerning sects and cults, see McGuire, Meredith B., *Religion, the Social Context*, Wadsworth, 1981, pp. 110-118.
- 5) See Campbell, Colin, *Toward a Sociology of Irreligion*, Macmillan, 1971, pp. 57-65.
- 6) For this period, see Pritchard, Linda K., «Religious Change in Nineteenth-Century America», in Glock and Bellah (eds) *op. cit.* pp. 297-327.
- 7) Herberg, Will, «The Contemporary Upswing of Religion», in Birnbaum, Norman, and Lenzer, Gertrud, (eds) *Sociology and Religion* Prentice-Hall, 1969 p. 403.
- 8) Glock, Charles Y., «The Religious Revival in America?», in Birnbaum and Lenzer (eds), *op. cit.* p. 404.
- 9) Lazerwitz, Bernard, «Religion and Social Structure in the United States», in Schneider, Louis(ed), *Religion, Culture and Society*, John Wiley, 1964, p. 430.
- 10) Glock, 1969, p. 404. For additional data, see Lazerwitz, *op. cit.*, p. 427, where is it recorded that 72 percent of the population identified with the Protestant churches, 22 percent with the Catholic, 3 percent with the Jewish religion and 1 percent with others.
- 11) For these and similar data, see Wuthnow, *op. cit.* pp. 117-123, esp. p. 122.
- 12) *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12.
- 13) See *ibid.*, p. 9-10. Some more details: About 3,000 spiritual or alternative communities have been listed in *The Spiritual Guide for North America* during the period 1972-1975, 800 of which were located in California, including 300 in the Bay Area alone. The latter figure corresponds to a ratio of 10 per 100,000 population. For California as a whole, the ratio was 4.0, for Arizona 5.3, for New York 1.9, and only 0.8 for Virginia and 0.1 for

Mississippi.

- 14) For these notes concerning this movement, see Johnson, Gregory, 《The Hare Krishna in San Francisco》, in Glock and Bellah (eds), *op. cit.* pp. 31-51.
- 15) For this movement, see Messer, Jeanne, 《Guru Maharaj Ji and the Divine Light Mission》, in Glock and Bellah (eds) *op. cit.* pp. 52-72.
- 16) See Tobey, Alan, 《The Summer Solstice of the Healthy-Happy-Holy Organization》, in Glock and Bellah (eds,) *op. cit.* pp. 5-51.
- 17) Petersen D. and Mauss A., 《The Cross and the Commune》, in Glock, Charles Y., (ed), *Religion in Sociological Perspective*, Wadsworth, 1973, pp. 261-279.
- 18) See Heinz, Donald, 《The Christian World Liberation Front》, in Glock and Bellah (eds) *op. cit.* pp. 143-161.
- 19) See Lane, Ralph, Jr., 《Catholic Charismatic Renewal》, in Glock and Bellah (eds), *op. cit.* pp. 162-179; also, McGuire, *op. cit.* pp. 137-139.
- 20) See Stone, Donald, 《The Human Potential Movement》, in Glock and Bellah (eds), *op. cit.* pp. 93-115.
- 21) The following are some figures given by D. Stone: Encounter groups alone are estimated to have involved three to six million people by 1970 (*op. cit.* p. 94); Esalen institute involves over 20,000 persons each year (*ibid.* p. 98); TM: 500,000 as of January 1975, Silva Mind Control: 350,000 in the period 1966-1974, Arica 20,000; est 30,000, and Psychosynthesis nearly 1,000 in the period 1970-1974 (*ibid.* p. 100).
- 22) See Ofshe, Richard, 《Synanon: The People Business》, in Glock and Bellah (eds), *op. cit.* pp. 116-137.
- 23) See Glock and Bellah (eds), *op. cit.* pp. 333-366. See also Bellah, *Varieties of Civil Religion*, Harper & Row, 1980, pp. 167-187, where Bellah's conclusion is reprinted.
- 24) *Ibid.*, p. 339.
- 25) *Ibid.*, p. 341.
- 26) *Ibid.*, p. 354.
- 27) See Stark, Werner, *The Sociology of Religion*, Vol. II, *Sectarian Religion*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, pp. 5-29 and 37-46.
- 28) Stark, *op. cit.* p. 5.
- 29) See Glock, Charles Y., 《On the Origin and Evolution of Religious Groups》, in Glock (ed), 1973, pp. 207-220.
- 30) Glock, *Ibid.*, p. 209.
- 31) Petersen D. W. and Mauss A. L., *op. cit.* pp. 261-279.
- 32) Cf Wuthnow, Robert, 《The new Religions in Social Context》, in Glock and Bellah (eds) *op. cit.* p. 288.
- 33) See Bell, Daniel, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, Heinemann 1973, and, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, Basic Books, 1976, pp. 3-30.
- 34) “Drug use . . . (is) widely perceived as a key countercultural phenomenon.” See Wuthnow, Robert, *The New Religions in Social Context*, in Glock and Bellah (eds), p. 279. For some specific references to drug use, see *ibid.*, pp. 8, 21 (3HO), pp. 39, 48, 49 (Hare Krishna) pp. 107, 110 (Human Potential Movement) and p. 116 (Synanon).
- 35) For a related discussion of the function of religion cf. my article: 《On Thomas Luckmann's Sociology of Religion》, in *Shakaigaku Ronsō*, Bukkyo University, 1980, pp. 67-82.
- 36) See Melton, Gordon., *The Encyclopedia of American Religions*, McGrath, 1978.